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NebuSec Reports Two Routes Around Telegram's Android Widget Filter

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According to NebuSec, a security company, researchers have found two separate ways to run code outside a security filter that Telegram added to its Android app last week. The claims are the researchers' own, and they are holding back several key details.

How the two routes reportedly work

NebuSec's technical analysis describes one route as relying on a widget bug the filter leaves uncovered. The second route combines a widget bug the filter does cover with a kernel bug, which the researchers say lets code get past it.

Widgets are small interactive blocks that bots place inside chat messages, and their JavaScript runs on the user's phone. Because only approved bots can currently send widgets on the live service, the researchers ran their demonstration on a Telegram test server.

Telegram's changes and the filter's limits

Telegram moved QuickJS, the small engine that runs widget JavaScript, into its own process on Android, and added a seccomp filter able to block or record the system calls that process makes. Both changes appear in the source code the company published for Telegram for Android 13.2.2 (7303).

In that published code the filter is set to audit mode. It still blocks attempts to start new programs or processes, but only records the other listed calls and lets them run. The published code does not show which setting the version people install uses.

The researchers say the sandbox rules live in the engine's own code, so a single memory bug in QuickJS could let a script read and write process memory and defeat those protections. They add that every widget runs in one shared process, so a hijacked widget could share memory with the widgets of other bots.

Unconfirmed points and the company's response

The write-up cites no CVE identifier and does not say whether the bugs were disclosed to the app's developers. It does not describe what the code could reach beyond the calculator app, such as messages or the rest of the phone, and it leaves open whether a user had to start the bot or tap the widget first.

Telegram's chief executive, Pavel Durov, wrote in a channel post that no one could be hacked just by receiving a message, and that a user first had to start a third-party service, which he said was fully patched on the server side. His post came before the researchers' demonstration.

A contributor to the telegram-bot-api project wrote in a GitHub bug report thread that general bots were not allowed to use widgets even in private chats. No later message in the thread says which bots remain permitted or that the restriction has been lifted.

Open questions

  • Which bots, if any, can currently send widgets on the live Telegram service?
  • Were the widget and kernel bugs reported to the app's developers, and is there a fixed version?
  • Does the version users install use the same filter setting as the published source code?

Key facts

  • NebuSec, a security company, says a malicious widget can bypass the security filter Telegram added to its Android app last week and run code outside it.
  • One route uses a widget bug that the filter does not cover.
  • The other route pairs a widget bug the filter does cover with a kernel bug.
  • The researchers say their demonstration on a Telegram test server opened the phone's calculator app.

Sources & evidence